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Abst r ac t
Thi sp a p er ana lyze s the e v olution of c onven tio ns i na s o c i et y with l oc ali n te raction
and m obile pla yer s. Thre e inno v ati ve as p ects are in tro duc ed: Im p erfect observ-
abi lity of pla y outs i de a pla yer ’sh o m e lo catio n, f rict i on i n the str a te gy a djust m en t
pro c ess, a nd restr icte d m o bilit y . It is sho wn that, i fm o bi lity is unr estri c ted , only
e￿cien t conven tio ns a r e sto c has ti chally stable. If the re ar e barriers on m obilit y ,
the c o exi s tence of di￿er en t conven ti ons can b e obse rv ed.W hile i m p er f e ct o bserv-
abi lity and fri ct ion al one cannot pre ven t so ciet y from r eac hing an o v e rll e ￿ cien t
outcom e, r estri ct ed mo b i lityc a n.
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1 In tro duc tio n
In rec enty ears , there has b een cons i derable i n tere st i nc o o rdi na ti o n prob l em si n
ga m es (e . g . Kandori et al . (1 99 3), V ega {Redondo (19 95 , 1 99 6), Y o ung ( 19 9 3 ) ,
among m an y others) .W h e n a g ame p o sses ses s e vera l stri ct equilibria, the tra-
ditio nal re￿nem e n ts of Nash equilib ri um are not applic ab l e. On the o ther ha nd,
stro ng sel ectio n results ha v e b een de riv ed from e voluti o nary l earning m o d e ls.
Whil e m ost m o del s a re based o n the h yp o thesis of r an dom m at ching among the
￿
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1me m b ers o f the p opu lation (e. g. Bin m o re and Sam uelson (1 9 94), Ka ndori et al.
(19 93), Yo ung (19 9 3 )), an incr ea si ng n um b er of pap ers de al sw i th lo c al inter action
structu r es (e. g. A nd erlini a nd Ianni (19 96), Be rningha us a nd Sc h w al b e (1 9 9 4a,b),
Boy er an d Orl ￿ ea n (1 992), Blum e (1 993), Ell iso n (19 93 ), Esh e le ta l .( 1 9 9 6 ) ). I n
these m o del s, e ac h play er is m atc he do n l y with a subset of the p o pul at i on , h e r
neighb ourh o o d . Wi th resp e ct to eq uil i brium sel ectio n resul ts , how ever, the m atc h-
ing m echa nism seem s to b e irrelev an t: F or a large c las s of adaptati o n rul es a nd
generi c m o del ling of m uta ti on s, the risk dominan t equil i br ium is s e lected (a con-
ce pt i n tro d uc ed b yH a rsan yi and Selten (1 98 8)) as the uni que sta bl e o utc om e,
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inde p ende n t of the underl ying i n teractio n s truc ture. On the o the r hand , re cen t
w ork b yB ha sk ar and V eg a-Redo ndo (1 99 6 ), Ely (1995), and Oec hs sl er (1 997) has
sho w n that the sel e ctio n of the ri sk do m inant equilibriu m i s d ue to the p re su m p-
ti o n o f an exog e no usly ￿xe di n ter a ction structure .I nt h e ir m o d e ls, the pl a yers
can ch o ose the ir ne igh b o urho o ds b ym o ving b et w ee nl o cations . In this setti ng,
the pa y o￿ d o m i na n te quilibrium can b e the unique stable o utcom e . The ex pla-
nation f o r this re su l ti sv e ry in tu i ti v e: The i ne￿cien t e qui libri um can b e u pset
b y a single pla y er’ s m o ving to an uno c c upied lo c at i on an d p l a ying the stra te gy
corresp o ndi ng t o t h e e ￿cien te q uilib rium .A ll o ther pl a yers wil l then foll o wa s
so on as the y get the c ha nce to m o v e. Co nvers e ly ,i n a situa tion where all pl a yers
initially p l a yt h ee ￿cien t equilib ri um , no pla y er w ou l d foll o wi f a n yn umbe r o f
play ers (short of the e n ti re p o pul at i on ) m o v e d to a nothe r lo c at i o n to pl a yt h e
ri s k do m inant but i ne ￿cien t equilibr i um . A sa c o nseque nce, the risk domi na n t
eq uili brium is m uc hm or e l ikel y to b e desta bi lized b y ‘tr e mbles’ tha n the e ￿c i e n t
eq uili brium .
The purp ose o f thi s pap er i s to exam i ne un de r what co ndi ti ons thi se ￿ciency
resul t can b e generali zed t ol ess restri ctiv e a ssum ptions concerning the pla y ers’
b ehaviour. I fo c u s on three asp ec ts: I m p erf ect obs e rv ab ilit y of pla y , fri ct i on in
the adjus tm ent pro c ess , a nd lim it ed m ob i lit y .
Ely (1 995) and Oec hs sl er (19 97) presum e the a bi lit yo f e a c hp l a y e r to o bserv e the
indi vidual stra te gi es and pa y o￿ s o f a ll other pla y ers i n the en tire p o pulati on an d ,
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wha t i s m ore, to tak e all th i s inform at ion into acc ou n tw h e nc ho osing his strategy .
How ever, i n the con te xt o f lo cal in ter action, and e spe c i ally i n the c as e o f l ar ge
p o pulati o ns usual ly co nsi de red i ne v ol utiona ry m o de ls , i t is natural to a s sume
that p l a yers h a v e lo c al infor mation int h e s e ns e tha t the y a re b ette r inform e d
ab out their n e ighb o urs’ doings tha n a b out wh at i s going o n at o the rl o c at i on s .
Moreo v er, I b el ie v e that the lim ited c a paci ty to ga the r, m e m orize and m ak e
use of inform ation is an e ss e n tial fe a ture o f b ou nde d rat io nali ty .T h e refore, the
presen t m o del depa rts f ro m th e framew ork of Ely and Oec hs sl er b y a ssum ing tha t
the pl ay ers can o nl yi m p e rfectl y ob se rv e the pl a yo f t h e g ame outside thei ro wn
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Excepti ons are V ega{Redondo (199 5), whe re pl ayers’ s tr ategy cho ice s a r e base d on e xp ec-
tatio ns , and V eg a { Redondo (19 96), whe re a di￿er en tm atc hing m ec hanism is c o ns i de re d.
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As this i s a m o del o f b ounde d r a ti onali t y , I as sume the pla y er s t o b e ma l e.
2nei gh b ourho o d. Of the v arious con c ei v a ble w a ys to m o del i m p erfe ct o bserv abilit y ,
Ic o nside rt w os z en a r ios whic h seem the m os t straigh tfor w ard to m e .I n the ￿rs t
setti ng , the pl ay e rs can obs e rv ep l a ya t d i sta n tl o cations only with a certa i n
(p o siti v e) pro bab ilit y , whi chm a yv a ry a c ro ss lo c at i o ns. Th e c hoic e o f lo c ations
is then restri cted to the ones w he re pl a y is actua l ly obse rved.
In the sec on d se tti ng, pla ya t d i sta n t lo cations cann ot b e o bserv e d at al lp r i or
to m o ving. All pl a yers obs e rv e only a s tatisti c a b o ut pla ya t a n y other than
thei r presen tl o cation, namel y the a vera ge pa y o￿ ac ro ss p l a y ers at tha t l o c ation.
Play ers c a nnot obs erv e the strategy di s tri butions prev ail ing at other lo c at i o ns.
Lo cation c hoice ha st o b e m a de under imp erf ect inform ation. Onl y a fte rm o vi ng,
i. e. after the l o cation c hoic eh a s b e e n irrev oc ab l y ￿xed for tha t p e rio d , the pl ay er
le a rns the strateg yd i stribution at the ne wl o c a t i on . H o w ever, i ti s a ssum e d tha t
the pl a yerm i gh tn o t b e able to adjus t h i ss t ra tegy i mm edi atel y after m o ving to
an e wl o cation. He c an do this o nl y with a ce rta i n( p o s i tiv e) prob abil ity .
The second s z enari o b ears so m e sim i larit y to the a ssum ptions m ad e b yB h ask ar
and V ega {Redondo (19 96). Ho w ever, the re is a fundam en ta l di ￿erence wi th re -
sp e ct to the w a yf ri ctio n is i n tro duce d. In their m o de l, pla ya t a l ll o c at i on s is
p erfectly o bserv able b ya l l pla y ers a t all times. H o w eve r, kno wing tha t the y can
adjus t thei r s trat egie s only wi th a ce rtain prob abil ity p after m o vi ng , the pl a yers
com pute the ir ex p e ct e d pa y o￿ s f o r al ll o cations, ta ki ng p into a c cou n t. L o c a ti on
c ho i ce i s then carrie d out o n the ba si s of exp ected pa y o￿s . As a consequenc e, if
p is small , pla y ers c an b e d e terred fro mm o vi ng t o a l o c at i on wh ere the e ￿cien t
conv enti on is pla y ed b ec a use they ex pe ct to b e unable to a djust thei r s trategie s
at the ne wl o cation. In th e p re sentm o d e l, in con tras t, lo ca ti on c ho i ce i si nd e -
p enden to f p . T he probabi lit ya ￿ e cts o nly the pl a yers ’ a c tua l strategy c hoic e, no t
thei r dec ision to m o ve.I t w i ll b e s e en that the as sumpti o n o f the pla y ers’ ta ki ng
fri ction in to a c count prior to m o vi ng has the sam e e￿ec ta sr e stricted m ob i lit y (as
in tro duce d in sec tion 7 of this pap e r) i n tha t it c a n pre ven tp l a y ers fro m m o vi ng
to a preferr ed l oc at i on .
It w i ll b e sho w n th a t, in b oth s e ttings , the selection of the pa y o￿ domi na n t
eq uili brium can b e sustained as l on g a s m obil ityi s unrestricted. Th i s result
reinfo rc es the fol k theorem th at m ob i lit y promotes e￿ ci e ncy .H o w ever, if m ob i lit y
is l imited, e. g . due to lim ited c a paci ty of lo cations to a ccom o d ate pl a yers , the
co exis te nce of d i ￿eren t con v en tions m a yb eo b s e rv ed. F urther, in the case o f t w o
lo cations , i t will b e s ho wn tha t all st o c h astic al ly stab le states in v olvea t least o ne
lo cation where th e risk do m inant con ven ti o n is pla y ed. T h at is, r estricti ng the
play ers’ m ob i lit y actua l ly pre ven ts the m fro m ac hievin g o v erall e￿cien tp l a y .
The pa p er i s organi zed as fol lows . The next sec tion pro vi des an inform al descrip-
ti on of t h e m o del . Se ctio n 3 presen ts th e bas i cm o d e l, the d y na m ics o f wh i c h
are discussed in s e c t i on 4. I n sec tion 5, I bri e￿y descri b e a m e th o d to determine
sto c ha sti ca l ly st a bl es e ts , whic hw a s dev el o p ed b yG l en n El lison (19 95). I n sec -
ti o n 6, eq uilibriu m selection re su l ts a re deriv ed. S e ct i o n 7 anal yzes the i m pa c to f
3m obil ity restrictions . The ￿na l se ct ion con c ludes.
2 Inform al D es crip ti o n of the Mo del
Im a gine a net w ork o f adjoining ci ties o r r eg i on s (l o cati o ns), inhabited b y the
me m b ers of a large but ￿ni te p opulatio no fp l a y ers. Ine ac hp e rio d, eac hi n-
hab i tanto f a l o cation is pairwi se m a t c hedw i th a l lh i sn e ighb o urs, i . e. all o ther
inhabitan ts o f tha tl o cati o n, a nd (in the case o f o v erlap ping n e ighb o urho o d s) also
with inhab i tants o f nei gh b ouring l o c ations, to pla y a co ordination gam e. F ami lia r
ex am pl es whic h ￿t to this setti ng include the c ircu l ar in te ra c tion structure (e .g .
Ell ison (19 93 )), w here in teraction tak es place b e tw een nei gh b ouring l o cations on
a ci rcular l ine ; or the g ri d structure (e. g. B erni n ghaus a nd Sc h w alb e (1 99 4 b)),
where eac hl o cation is represen ted b y a no de of a lattice, o r i n fact an ya l lo c a ti on
of l oc at i on s i n E uk lidea n spa c e.
Play ers c an c ho ose thei r nei gh b ourho o ds b ym o vi ng freel y b et w een lo c at i on s .
Af ter l o cati on s h a v eb e e nc ho sen a t the b e gi nn ing o f eac h p erio d, th e strate gies fo r
the co o rdi na ti on gam e a re determined b ya n imitation r ul e :E a c hp l a y e r a dop ts
the strategy whic hg a i ned the hi g hest a v erag e pa yo￿ a t hi s presen tl o cation i n
the prev ious p erio d.
Ac rucial assum pti on of the m o del i st h e i m p erfect o bserv abil it y o f pla y out side
ap l a y e r’s o wn ne ighb ourho o d. Tw o di￿eren t set tings are considere d. First , I
as sume that a p l a yer presen tly s i tua te d a t s ome lo ction L b e able to observ et h e
0
a v erag e pa y o ￿ g ained b ye ac h s trategy at anothe rl o cati on L wi th probabi lit y
0
p( L; L ) > 0. F or i ns tance , this probabi lit yc ou l d b e a decr e as i n g func tion o f
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the g e o gra phi cal di s tance b e tw een l o cations L an d L :A p l a y e ri sm or e l i k e ly
to observ ep l a y a t l o cations nearer to his ho m e, and l ess l ikel y to o bserv ep l a y
at m or e d i sta n tl o c ations. Of all o bserv ed lo cations , the pl a yert he np i c k s the
one w i th the hi g hest a vera ge pa yo￿ ga i ned bya n y s trategy .I f thi si s not uni q ue,
the pla y er random iz e s , placi ng p ositiv e pro babil it y on eac hl o c at i on wh ere the
obs e rv edp a y o￿ i sm ax im al. After m ovi ng, the p l a yers i m ply adopts the stra te gy
that g aine d the hi g hest a v erage pa y o ￿ a t the new l o cation i n the prev ious p er i od .
In the second setti ng , the pla y ers a re unable to obs e rv e the a v erag e pa y o￿ ga ine d
b ye ac h stra te g y at o the rl o c at i o ns. T h e y ob ser ve only the av erage pa yo￿ across
all stra te gi es at a n yl o c at i on . Tha t i s, fo r eac hl o c at i o n (o the r than his ho me
lo cation), the pla y er can on l y observ e the a v erag e pa yo￿ to the i nha bi ta n ts o f
that lo c at i o n, but not the pa yo￿s gain ed b y the indi vidual strategies. Eac hp l ay er
wil l then c ho ose the l o cation with the hi g hest a v erag e pa yo￿, a nd randoz mi z e i n
case of ties . Once a pl a yerh a s m ov ed to a new lo c at i on , he l earns the a v erag e
pa y o ￿s g aine db y all stra te gi es at tha tl o c at i on . H o w ever , h e i sa b l e to adju st
his s trategy a c co r di ng to the im i ta ti on rule on l yw i th probabi lit y p> 0. F or
4sim plicit y , I a ssu m e tha t thi s pro bab ilit yi s c o nstan ta cros s pl a yers , lo c at i o ns,
and p erio ds .
As a ￿rs t result, i tw i ll b e sho wn that, in an absorbi ng s ta te o f the d y na m ical
system g e nerated b y the i ndividua l a daptat ion pro ce s ses, all pla y ers l ive at the
sa m e lo cation a nd pla y the sam e strate gy . The m ain result states tha t, giv en tha t
all pl a yers l ive a t the sa m e lo cation, a n e￿ cien t con v enti o n is le s s lik ely to b e
destabilize db ys i m ultaneous m i st ak es on the part of the pl ay ers tha n a n ine ￿ -
ci en tc on v e n tion, irresp ectiv e o f th e underly ing a ssum ptions con c erning imp e rfect
obs e rv ab i lit y and fri ctio n. In the case of re st r icted m o bilit y ,h o w e v e r, thi s result
no l o nger ho l ds. I ns te ad , o v eral l e￿ciency a s a stab l eo u tco m e is precluded.
3 The M o del
There is a l a rge but ￿ni te p op ul at i on I = f 1 ;: ::;N g of pl ay ers and a ￿nite set L,
jLj￿ 2, o f l o cations whi ch are represe n ted b y the no des of a g r a ph. Two lo cati ons
L; M 2L ar e c on ne ct e d if the resp e ctiv e no des of the gra ph a re co nne cted b ya n
edge. L e t C ( L) ￿L de note the union of the s e t of all lo cations conn e cted to L
with L its e lf. W ep l ac e no further restrictions on the in teraction structure e xcep t
for ex cl u di ng the tri vial case of ful l con ne ctivit y ,i . e . I a ssum e tha t ther e exis t a t
le a st t w ol o c a t ion s L, M with L= 2 C ( M ).
Tim ei s discre te. A t th e b eginning of e ac h p erio d t , eac hp l a y er i 2 I c ho os e s
t
a lo cation ￿ 2L . Th e neighb ourho o d of pla y er i in t is de ￿n e db y the set o f
i
t
play ers C ( ￿ ) = f ig , the el em e n ts of wh i c h a re refe rred to a s her neighb our s . A fter
i
t
lo cations a re c ho s en, e ac h play er c ho oses a strateg y s 2f x; y g . Eac h play er i s
i
t t t
then c ha racter ized by a stra te gy {l o c ation p ai r ￿ := ( s; ￿ ). Th e st ate of the
i i i
t t t t tN
sys te m at t i me t is a vector ￿ =( s; ￿ ), wh ere the v ec to r s =( s ) indica te s
ii =1
t tN
a s trategy for eac h play er, and ￿ =( ￿ ) i ndicates the lo cations of the pla y ers.
ii =1
t
Let ￿ denote the set o f all p os si ble sta te s of the s y st e m. F urther, l et n deno te
L
t
the n um be r o f inhab itan ts o f l o cation L in state ￿ .
In eac h p erio d t,a f t e rl o cations a re dete rm ine d , eac hp l a y e ri sm at c hed w i th eac h
of hi sn e ighb ours to pla y a co ordination gam e
x y
x a; a b; c
: (1 )
y c; b d; d
Co ordination g ame s a re c haracteri ze d b y the exis te nce o ft w o s tri ct N a sh{e qui libri a ,
( x; x ) a nd ( y; y ), i. e. a> c an d d> b . The m os t i n tere sting c as e i s the one where
one of the equil ibr i a, s a y( x; x ), i sr i s k dominan t, where as the other o ne is pa yo￿
dominan t, i. e .( a ￿ c ) > ( d ￿ b )a n d a< d . T he fo cus of the presen t pap e ri so n
this case. As a n ex am p l e, c o nside r the gam e
5x y
x 3; 3 2 ; 0
: (2 )
y 0; 2 4 ; 4
3.1 The I mita t io n R ul e
Whenev er a pla y er g ets the c ha nc et o a d just his stra te gy f o r the c o ord i na ti on
ga m e, he wil ld os oa cc o rdi n g to an i mi ta ti o n rule. T hi s rule prescrib e st oc h oos e
the stra te g y tha t g ai ned the highest a v erage pa y o ￿ at the pl a yer’s l o cation i n the




C (L) in s tate ￿ , a nd supp o se tha t v of the s e pla y ers c hos e x , v ￿ c . Then,
L L L
the a v erag e pa y o ￿ g aine db ya n x {play e r a t lo cation L in st a t e ￿ is
( v ￿ 1) a +( c ￿ v ) b
L L L




and the a v erag e pa y o￿ g aine db ya y {play er is
vc +( c ￿ v ￿ 1) d
L L L




Loners, i . e. pla y e rs w ho ha v e no neigh b o urs to in te ra c tw i t h , receiv ea r es e rvation
p ayo￿ ￿ < mi n f a; b; c; d g .
r
Now the i m itati o n rule pre sc rib es to pla y strategy x if ￿ ( L; ￿ ) >￿ ( L; ￿ ), wh i c h
x y
is eq ui v alentt o
c ( d ￿ b )+ a ￿ d
L
￿
v > =: v; (5 )
L
L
a ￿ c + d ￿ b
and they c ho ose y if the re ver se inequalit y holds, whic hi se quivale n tt o
c ( a ￿ c ) ￿ a + d
L
c ￿ v > : (6 )
L L
a ￿ c + d ￿ b
If b o th s tr a tegi es earned the s ame pa y o ￿, the pl ay er rand omi zes, placi ng p o siti ve
prob abil ityo n b o t hs t r a tegi es. Lone rs are sup p os e dt o p i c k a stra te g y at ra ndom .
￿
Note that th e a ssum ptions on risk do m i nance and e ￿ciency i m pla y that v >
L
￿ ￿ ￿
c ￿ v ,i . e . v > ( c= 2 ), and c ￿ v < (c= 2), for al ll o cations L.T h is m eans
L L L L
L L L
that it tak es less tha n half the p opula tion a t an yg i v e nl o c at i o n to m ak e x the
b etter strategy ,a nd m ore than ha l f the p opulation ha s to pla y y in o rde rt o m a k e
y the b etter strate gy .
3.2 Lo cati on Cho ic e
Ic o nside rt w os e ttings , the ￿rst o f wh ichf o c us e so n i m p e r f ect obs e rv ab i lit y alone,
whil e the s e cond on ea l so deals with fric tion.
3
F or e a s e of notation , w e write v fo r v (￿ ), e tc.
L L
63.2.1 Sett ing S1
A t the end o f eac hp e r i o d, eac h play er i at lo c at i on L o bserv es the a vera ge pa y o￿ s
ga i ned by b oth stra tegie sa t L , ￿ ( L; ￿ ) and ￿ ( L; ￿ ). F urthe r, he obs e rv es the
x y
a v erag e pa yo￿s at a ll oth e rl o cations M , ￿ ( M; ￿ ) and ￿ ( M; ￿), wi th resp e ctiv e
x y
prob abil ities p( L; M ) > 0. These proba bi lities a re indep enden t acros s pl a yers
and p erio ds . The lo c at i o ns fo r whic hp l a y e r i ’s realiza ti on o f p ( L; ￿ )i sp o s itiv e
are referred to as the lo c ations obser ve d b yp l a y e r i , and the set o f these lo c ations
is denoted b y L ( i;L ;￿ ). Pl a y e r i then c ho os e s the lo c at i o n with the hi gh e st
obs e rv edp a y o ￿ fo r an y stra te gy ,i . e . h e c ho o se sal o cati on
m ax m ax f ￿ ( M; ￿ ) ;￿ ( M; ￿) g : (7 )
x y
M 2L (i;L;￿ )
If the m axi m iz er of (7) is no t u ni que, the pla y er rand omi z es, pl ac ing p ositi ve
prob abil ity o n eac h.
Once l o cati o ns a re dete rm i ned, strat egie s are c hosen a c cord i ng to th e im i ta ti on
rule .
3.2.2 Sett ing S2
A t the end o f eac hp e r i o d, eac h play er i at lo c at i on L o bserv es the a vera ge pa y o￿ s
ga i ned by b oth stra tegie sa t L , ￿ ( L; ￿ ) and ￿ ( L; ￿ ). F urthe r, he obs e rv es the
x y
a v erag e pa y o￿ ac ro ss al l pla y ers a t eac hl o cation M 6= L :
z ￿ ( M; ￿)+( n ￿ z ) ￿ ( M; ￿)
M x M M y
￿( M; ￿ ): = (8 )
n
M
(where z is the n um be r o f x{play ers at M )f o r n ￿ 2, ￿ ( M; ￿ )= ￿ fo r
M M r
n = 1 , a nd i t is unde￿ned otherwise. Thi sa v erage pa yo￿ a t M is re ferred to as
M
the lo c ati o np ayo￿ at M . Th e pla y er the n c ho os e s the lo c at i o n with the hi gh e st
lo cation pa y o￿, i .e .
arg m ax ￿ ( M; ￿ ) :
M 2L
If there is m o re tha n o ne lo ca t ion wh e re the lo cation pa yo￿i s m ax im al , the pl ay er
rand omi ze sb e t w e en a l l these l o cations , c ho o sing eac h w ith p ositi ve probabi lit y .
t￿ 1
t
Af ter lo cations ha v e b een det erm i ned, eac h play er who ha s no t m o ved( ￿ = ￿ )
i i
adjus ts hi s strate gy according to t h e imitation rule. Ea chp l a y e r w ho ha s m o ved
t ￿1
t
( ￿ 6= ￿ )g e ts the o pp o rtuni ty to a djust his stra te gy w i th p robabili ty p.I f t h e
i
i
opp ortunit y arises, he uses the imitation rule . Otherwi se, h e stic ks to his prev ious
t￿ 1
stra t eg y s .
i
74 The Dynam ic s
The b eha vi o ural rul es describ ed i n S1 and S2 i n th e previo us sec tion ea c h de￿ne
a sto c ha sti c pro c e ss on the s tate sp ace ￿. As the sta te spa c ei s ￿nite , and eac h
play er’s dec isions c o nce rning strat egy a nd lo c at i on choic e dep e nd only on the
sta te in the previo us p er io d, e ac h o f these pro c ess e sc o nstitute s a Ma rk o vc ha i n.
W e a re in terested i n absor b ing states of the s y st e m, i . e. s tates th at, once e n te red,
canno t b e l eft agai n . Suc h s tates are s ta t ion ary o v er ti m e in the sense that no
play er c ha nges eit he rh i s strategy o r l o cation an ym or e .
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
De ￿n i tion 1 As t ate ￿ =( s; ￿ ) 2 ￿ is abs or bing if prob( ￿ j￿ )= 1 .
The foll o wi ng prop ositi o n states tha t, i n a n abs orbing s ta te ,a l lp l a y e rs m ust liv e
at the sam el o cation a nd pla y the sa m e s tra te gy .
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
L e mma 1 If ￿ =( s; ￿ ) 2￿ is absorbing, the n ￿ = ￿ and s = s for al l
i j i j
i; j 2 I .
Pr o of. Sup p os e tha tt w ol o cations are i nha bi ted i na n a b s o rbi ng s tate. Eith er
the m axim al a v erag e (l o cation) pa y o￿ s di￿er, in whi ch ca se pla y ers wi ll o bs er ve
this with p ositi ve probabi lit y and m o ve, o r the relev an tp a y o￿s a t b o th lo cations
are e qua l , in whic hc as e p l a y ers ran do mi ze b e tw ee n the lo c at i o ns. In either case,
there i sa p o s i tiv e probabilit yo fm o v em entb e t w e en the l o c at i o ns, a con tra diction
to the state b eing a bs orbing. H ence, a bs orbing sta t es a re c h aracteri zed b y a single
inhabite dl o c a t i o n . It is ob vi o us tha t, i ns u c h a state, a ll pla y ers m ust earn the
sa m ep a y o ￿ (or else s ome pla y ers w ould wan tt o c ha nge thei r stra te gi es). This i n
turn requires t ha t a l l pla y the sam e st rategy . 2
There a re t w od i ￿eren tt yp es of absorbi n g states: Th ose w her e only x is pla y ed ,
and those w he re o nl y y is pla y ed. W e cal l suc h states c on ventions .
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
De ￿n i tion 2 A state ￿ =( s; ￿ ) i sa c on v e n tion if s = s an d ￿ = ￿ for al l
i j i j
i; j 2 I .
4
Prop os i tion 1 sta te sa w e ll kno wn result fro m the theory o f M ar k o vc hains ,
namel y that the pro c ess con verg e st o o ne of the a bsorb i ng s tates with probabi lit y
one a s time g o es to i n￿nit y .
Prop osit ion 1 As t im e te nds towar ds in ￿n i ty , the pr o c essc on verges to a c on-
vention wit h pr ob ability one, ir r es p e ct ive of the init i al state .
How ever, whic h of the p ossi ble con v en tions wil lb er e ac hed in the long run de p ends
on the i nitia l sta t e of the system . I n o rde r to deri ve equilibrium s e le ction re su l ts
inde p ende n tly of i ni tial conditi on s ,Ie m plo y the c o nce pt of stochastic stabil ity .
4
e. g. Kem en y/Sne l l( 1 976), The o re m 3 : 1 : 1, p.43.
85 Sto chastic Stabi lit y
Supp ose that in eac h p erio d there is a s m all prob abil ity( i ndep e ndent acros s
play ers a nd p e rio ds) ￿> 0 that e ac hp l a y e r‘ trem ble s’ or ‘ m ak es a m i s tak e’
i. e. c ho o se s a noth er tha n the in tende d s trategy a nd/or l o cation, suc h tha t all
5
stra t eg y {l o cation pairs ha v e p o siti v e probabilit y. I t foll o w s that eac h s ta te o f
the system can b e re ac hed f ro m e very ot her sta te . Tha t i s, w eh a v e an ergo dic
Mark o vc hain whic hh a sa u n i que statio na ry distributio n. W e then o btain the
limit distr ib ution of the pro c ess fro m the uni que sta ti o nary distri bu ti on b y letti ng
the probabi lit yo f m istak es v anish. B y the no ww el l kno wn m e tho d of p e rturb e d
Mark o vc hains i n tro duc ed b yF reid l in an d W entzel (1984) , and furth e rd e v e lo p e d
b y Kandori et a l .( 1 9 93), an d Y o ung ( 19 9 3), i t can b e sho w n that the states wh i c h
ha v e p o sit ive prob ab i lit yi n the lim i t d i stribution, re ferred to a s sto c hastic all y
stable state s , for m a subset of the set of a bso r bi ng state s o f the m o del with no
noise. F urther, the sto c has ti cally s table states a re those a bso r bi ng sta t es wi th
the largest bas i ns of attraction. A b asin of at tr action of a state ￿ is the set o f all
sta te s from whic h the unp e rturb e d pro c ess con v erges t o ￿ with p r o babili t yo ne,
and i ts size i si n v e rsely re lated t o the m inim al to tal n um be ro f m i s tak es re q uire d
to reac h this bas i n from all other absorbi n g states. Tha t is, the co nc ept of the
lim i t distributio n a l lows us to s e le c t a subs e t o f the set of a bsorbing state s o f the
m o del with no noise. The f o cus of thi s pa p er is on dete rm i ni ng sto c h astic al ly
sta bl ec on v e n tions. T o this end, I use a m etho d de velop e db yE l liso n ( 1 99 5),
whichw i ll b e brie ￿y d e scrib ed for the re ad e r’s co n venie nc e.
De￿ne the set o f all x {c on v e n tions b y
￿ := f ￿ =( s; ￿ ) js = x; ￿ = ￿ 8i; j 2 I g ;
x i i j
and anal o gousl yt h es e t o f all y {c on v en tions b y
￿ := f ￿ =( s; ￿ ) j s = y; ￿ = ￿ 8 i ;j 2 I g :
y i i j
The s e t of absorbi ng s t a tes o f the pro c e ss with no tre mbles ( ￿ =0 ) i s ￿ [ ￿.
x y
In order to so rt out those con v enti o ns tha t ha ve p os i tiv e prob abil ity in the lim it
distri bu tion , I em pl o y the concepts o f r ad iu s and c or adi us o f a ba sin of a ttr a ction
of a set of a bsorbin g s tates, i n tro duc ed b y Ell ison (1995 ). First, s ome a ddi ti o nal
notati o n ha s to b e i n tro duced.
Let ￿ ￿ ￿ [ ￿ b e a set of ab sorbing sta te so f t he m o de lw i th no noise ( ￿ = 0).
x y
The b asin of a tt r ac tion of ￿, denoted b y D (￿ ), is the set of a l l states fro m wh i c h
the Mark o vp r o cess con verg e s to a sta te in ￿ with prob abil ityo n e :
t 0
D (￿) : = f ￿ 2 ￿j prob( 9 ￿ suc h that ￿ 2 ￿ 8 t> ￿ j ￿ = ￿ )= 1 g :
In tuitiv ely s p eaking, the r adius of the set D (￿) is the n um b er o f trem bles (i n the
m o del with noise) nec essa ry to le a vet h i s set, starting fro m a sta te in ￿. W ri te
5
In ev ol utiona r y m o dels, suc ht r e m ble s are re ferred to a s mu tati on s .
90
c ( ￿;￿ ) fo r the n um be r o f i nd e pe nd e n ts i m ulta ne o us tre mbles nec essa ry for the
0
system to transit fr o m s tate ￿ to sta te ￿ . T hat is, c ( ￿) m easures the tr ansiti on
c ost be t w ee n the s e states in term s of the s e tre mbles. F urther, de ￿n e a p ath b y
1 2 ￿
a ￿nite seq uence ( ￿ ;￿ ;: ::;￿ ) of disti nc t s tates. The c ost of su c h a pa th i s
de￿ned b y
1 2 ￿ ￿ ￿1 t t +1
c ( ￿ ;￿ ;:::;￿ )= ￿ c ( ￿; ￿ ) :
t =1
The radius o f ￿ i st h e ‘ c heap e st’ path tha t l eads from an y s tate i n ￿ to an y o the r
sta te o utside the basin o f attra c tion of ￿.
De ￿n i tion 3 The ra di us of the b asin of att r action of a set ￿ ￿ ￿ [ ￿ is de￿ne d
x y
by
1 ￿ 1 ￿
R (￿) : = mi n c ( ￿ ;:::;￿ ) s. t. ￿ 2 ￿;￿ = 2 D (￿) :
1 ￿
( ￿ ;::: ;￿ )
1 ￿
The path ( ￿ ;:::; ￿ ) de￿ning the radius of D (￿) t h us descri b es the ‘c heap e st
w a y out’ of tha t set. In m ost cas e s , it w ill b e seen that thi s pa th i n volves but a
single transiti on , i . e . i tc o nsists o f t w o states o nly .I n thi sc a se, the c he ap e st w a y
out is realized b y a dire ct trans i tion from a state i n ￿ to a state outs i de D (￿).
In tuitiv ely , the l arg e r the radius, the ‘ cos tl ie r’ (in t erm s o f trem ble s ) i t is to le a ve
the set. Put di￿ere n tly: The larger the radius, the m ore i m probabl e is the ev ent
that sim ultaneou s m istak esb yi nd ivi du al pla y ers shift the system aw a y fro m thi s
set an d th us in to the ba si n of a ttracti o n of a nother a bsor bi ng set.
Co n vers e ly , the c or adius of the ba sin o f a ttracti on of a s e t o f a bsorbing sta te s
is de ￿n edb yt h en um be r o f trem ble sn e c essa ry to reac h thi ss e t from the m os t
‘unfa v ou r a ble ’ a bsorbing sta te outs i de th e set, i . e. from th e state where the
mi nimum n um be r of trem ble sr e quired to rea c h D (￿) is m ax imized.
De ￿n i tion 4 The co r a dius of t he b asin of attr ac tion of a se t ￿ ￿ ￿ [ ￿ is
x y
de￿ ne db y
1 ￿ ￿
CR (￿) := m ax min c ( ￿ ;:: :;￿ ) s. t . ￿ 2 D (￿) :
1 1 ￿
￿= 2 ￿( ￿; : ::;￿ )
The coradius th us m easures the m i nimum num be r o f trem ble s req uired to reac h
D (￿) from the m ost ‘ unfa vourable’ s ta te outs i de that se t. The small er the cora-
dius, the l ikeli er i s the e ven t tha t s i m ul tan e o us tre mbles shift the s y st em from
6
an y absorbi ng stat et o s o m e state i n D (￿). Elliso n’ s m ain resul t sta t es tha t a set
of states is s to c hastically sta bl e if the ra di us of i ts ba sin o f attra c tion e xceeds the
coradius. F ormall y , let ￿( ￿ ) denote the uniq ue stationary distri b uti on of t h e e r-
t +1 t
go dic M ar k o vc ha i n de￿ned b y the trans itio n prob abil ities pro b( ￿ j ￿ ) to gether
￿
with the pro babili ties of tre mbles giv en b y ￿ , and wri te ￿ :=l i m ￿ ( ￿ ) for the
￿! 0
6
Ellison’ s r esult a ctuall y refers to a m o r e str i ngentc o nc ept, the mo di ￿e d c oradi us , and the
the o r em b elo wi s ju st a corol lary of El lis on’ sm a i n theor em.H o w eve r, the m o di￿ed coradius i s
not needed in the pr es e n t context.
10lim i td i stribution o f this pro cess. T h e limit set ,i . e. the set o f sto c has ti c a l l y stab le
state s , is de￿ned b y
￿ ￿
￿ := f ￿ 2 ￿ [ ￿ j ￿ ( ￿ ) > 0g :
x y
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
If w ed e ￿ne ￿ (￿ ) := ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ), w ec a n write ￿ (￿ ) = 1 .
￿ 2 ￿
￿
Theorem 1 F or any ￿ ￿ ￿ [ ￿ ,i f R (￿) >C R (￿) , the n ￿ ￿ ￿,i . e .
x y
￿
￿ (￿) = 1 .
Pr o of. Ell ison (19 95), Theorem 1 on pa ge 1 6. 2
The th e or e m s tates tha t, if the radius o f the b asin o f attr ac tion of a set ￿ e xc ee ds
the coradius, a l l s to c ha sti cally s ta ble s tates are con tained in ￿. The intuitiv e
ex plan ati o n is tha t it i s easier to re ac h ￿ from a n y o the ra bso rbi ng set, tha n to
reac ha n y other ab s orbing se tf r om ￿ . T h us, ￿ is less lik el y to b e destabilize d
b ym utations tha n a ll o ther a bso rbi ng sets. A t the sa m et i m e, ￿ is m o re eas i ly
reac hed than other a bsorbing sets, giv en a n yi nitia l sta te. W e wil ln o wu s e t h e
theorem to determi ne the sto c ha sti cally stable c on v en tions i n our m o del .
6 Equilibrium Se le ction
Theorem 1 s t a ted ab o v e enable su s t os e l ec t those sub se ts from the set of a bso rb-
ing states of the m o del with no noise wh ich are sto c has ti c all y stable. F urther,
Lem m a 1 ensures tha t the states withi no n e s e t o f con v enti on s ￿ , s 2f x; y g ,
s
di￿er only with re spe c t to th e inhabit e dl o c at i o n. Tha t i s, all el em ents of ￿ are
s
ide n tica l up to a re l a b el ing o f lo c at i o ns. W e can infer th at R(￿ ) = CR (￿ ), and
x y
vi ce v ersa . The reas on is that, s i nce a ll states wi thin o ne set o f c on v en tions ￿
s
are i denti cal up to a re lab e ling of lo c at i o ns, the ‘ m os t unfa vourabl e’ stat e from
which the com pl em e n t bas i n o f a ttracti on can b e r e ac hed, i .e . the s tate from
which the m i nimum n um b er of trem ble sr e quired to re ac h the com pl em e n t set i s
m axi ma l ( w h i c hi s n e eded fo r the com puta ti on of CR ( ￿ )), i s e qua l to th e ‘ mo st
fav o urable ’ sta te fro m wh i c ht h e ba si n of attra c tion o f that set can b e left: I f all
sta te s are iden tic al , all states are e quall y ‘fa v o urable ’ o r ‘unfa v o urable ’. A s the
resp ectiv e b asins o f attraction o f the t w o sets of con ven tions fo rm a pa rti tion o f
the s tate s pace ,l ea vi n g one basin of a ttraction, s a y D (￿ ), a utomatical ly m eans
x
en tering the other ba si n of attracti on , D (￿ ). It fo l lows that the n um b er o f trem -
y
ble s req uired to le a ve the bas i n of att racti o n o f on e set o fc on v en tions is eq ual to
the n um be r o f t r embl es req ui red to reac h the bas i n o f attr action o f the o ther set
of c on v e n tions, wh ichi s the c om pl em en t set. Sta te d formal ly:
L e mma 2 In the pr es e nt mo del, R (￿ ) = CR (￿ ) and R(￿ ) = CR (￿ ) , in de-
x y y x
p e nde nt o f the assump ti o ns c onc erni n g obse r vab ility.
11Pr o of. Since al le l e m ents of ￿ are i denti cal up to a rela b e l ing o f lo c at i o ns, the
x
foll o wi ng holds. G i vena n y￿ 2 ￿,
y y
0 0 0 0 00
c ( ￿; ￿ )= c ( ￿; ￿ ) 8 ￿; ￿ 2 ￿ :
y y x
This im pl ie s
0 00 0 00
mi n c ( ￿; ￿ )=m i n c ( ￿; ￿ )= R (￿ ) 8 ￿; ￿ 2 ￿ : (9 )
y y x x
￿ ￿
y y
Sinc e the m i nimum c os t c ( ￿ ;￿ )t o g e t o u to f D (￿ ) is i denti ca l f o r a l l ￿ 2 ￿,
y x x
it i s also i denti cal to the m ax imum o ver ￿ 2 ￿ o f this cost, i . e .
x






Co m bini ng ( 9 ) and (1 0) yi el ds R(￿ ) = CR (￿ ). A sim ila r argu me n ts h o ws tha t
x y
R(￿ ) = CR (￿ ). 2
y x
W ew i ll now s tate ou rm a i n result that o nl ye ￿cien tc on v e n tions a re sto c h ast ic a l ly
sta bl e, pro vided that the p o pul at i on is n ot to o small . T he m o del S2 c on ta i ns
the e xtreme cas e o f p erfe ct o bserv abil ity( p =1 ) c o nside red b yE l y (1 995) an d
Oec hssler ( 19 9 7 ) a s a sp ecia l case. W es h o w that the l imit set c o rre sp onds to the
set o f (e￿ cien t) y {c on v e n tions b y pro vi ng tha t the r a diu s o f its b asin o f a ttr a ction
ex ceed s its corad i us.
Prop osit ion 2 In the mo del de ￿ne d by e ither S 1 or S2, the fol l o w ing holds: if
N> [ ( a + d ￿ 2 c ) = ( d ￿ b )] + 2 , on ly e￿c i en t c on ven tions ar es t o chastic al l y stab le,
￿
i. e. ￿ (￿ ) = 1 . Other wise , on ly r isk dom inan t c onventions a r e sto c hastic all y
y
stable, i. e. ￿(￿ ) = 1 .
x
Pr o of. W es h o w tha t the radius o f D (￿ ) e xceeds its cora di us i f N ex ceeds the
y
threshold indica te di n the prop os i ti on. Fi rst, w ec o m pute CR (￿ ), the m inim um
y
n um be r of trem ble sr equire d to reac h D (￿ ) fro m the m os t u n f a v o urable s tate
y
outs i de D (￿ ). Be caus e of Lem m a 2 , thi sn um be r i s e qual to R(￿ ), the m inim um
y x
n um be r of tre mbles req ui red to l eav e D (￿ ), sta rti ng fro m a sta te in ￿ . T o
x x
com pute thi sn um b e r, cons i der a state ￿ in ￿ . Lem m a 1 ensu r es that suc h sta te s
x
are c ha racter ized bya s i ng l e inhabit ed l o cation. Call this lo c at i on L . Sup po s e
0
t w o pla y ers trem bl e: the ys i m ulta ne o usly m o ve to a nothe r lo cation L = 2 C ( L )
0
and there s wi tc h to strategy y .C a l l the resulting state ￿ .
0 0
Fi rs t, cons i der S1 . Pla yers a t L o bserv e the a v erag e pa y o￿ ￿ ( L; ￿ )= d>
y
0 0
￿ ( L; ￿ )= a with prob ab i lit y p( L; L ) > 0. There is a p ositi ve probabi lit y
x
0 N ￿2 0
( p( L; L ) ) that al l play ers at L observ e this, and th us m ov et o L a nd pla y
0
y .H ence, ￿ is outsi de the b asin o f a ttr a ction of ￿ , b ec au s e there is a p ositi ve
x
prob abil ity tha t a y {c on v e n tion w i ll b e reac hed.
0 0
Now consider S2. Th e lo cation pa y o￿ a t L in state ￿ is
0 0 0
￿ (L; ￿ )= d> ￿ ( L; ￿ )= a;
x
120
whichi m plies tha t a l l x {play ers wi ll m o v e from L to L in the next p e rio d. F ur-
N ￿ 2
ther, a s p> 0, the re is a p ositi ve probabi lit y( p ) that al l N ￿ 2p l a y e rs
0 0
wil l b e able to a djust thei r strategie sa t L , and thus switc ht oy . Again, ￿
is outs i de the basi n o f attracti o n of ￿ , b ecause there i s a p o sit ive pro babil -
x
0
ity tha t a y {conv enti on will b e reac hed. A st w o trem ble ss u ￿ ce to reac h ￿ ,
R(￿ ) = CR (￿ ) = 2.
x y
Nowc o m pute R (￿ ), the m inim um n um be r o f trem bles nec essa ry to l eave D (￿ ),
y y
sta rt ing f ro m a n y y {conven ti o n. Ac cording t o Lem m a2 , t h i sn umbe r i se qua l to
CR (￿ ). Con si der a s tate ￿ 2 ￿ . Lem m a 1 en sures that s uc h sta te s a re c harac -
x y
terize db ya s i ng l e inha bi ted lo c at i on . C a l l this l o cati on L .L e a ving the ba sin o f
attra c tion o f ￿ can not b e a c hie vedb ys o m e pla y ers’ m o vin g to a lo cation outs ide
C ( L ) and there s wit ching t o x since the se pl ay ers w ould ga i na l o w er pa y o ￿ tha n
thos e rem ai ni ng a t L and, as a conseque nc e, no pla y er w ou l df o l low to the l oc a -
ti o n wh e re x is pla y ed. Therefore, th e trem bles m us t be su c h tha t the trem bling
play ers sw i tcht oxbut sta y at the lo c at i on L , o r wit hi n C (L ). Conse quently , the
n um be r o f tre mbles m ust b e hi g h enoug h to ensure tha t stra teg y x g ains a hi gh e r
0
pa y o ￿ th an stra te gy y in C ( L). That is, a nec essa ry c o ndi tion for a state ￿ to
￿
be i n D (￿ ) i s that v ￿ v .T o tra nsit from ￿ to D (￿) t h us r e quir e se n ough
x L x
L
play ers’ switc hin g to x such that
N ( d ￿ b )+ a￿ d
￿
v >v = :
L
L
a ￿ c + d ￿ b
This can b e a c hiev edb y
$ %
N ( d ￿ b )+ a ￿d
R (￿ ) = CR (￿ ) = +1
y x
a￿ c + d ￿b
trem ble s. It is eas ily see n tha t R (￿ ) e xceeds CR (￿ ) = 2 fo r N> [( a + d ￿
y y
2c ) = ( d ￿ b )] + 2, a nd R (￿ ) exceeds CR (￿ ) o therwi se . T he re su l tf ol lows from
x x
Theorem 1. 2
In the ca se of l a rge p opulations usu al ly cons i dered in e voluti o nary m o de ls , N will
typically e xcee d the l o w er b o und [( a + d ￿ 2 c )= ( d ￿ b )] + 2 n e cessary to esta bl is h a n
e￿ cien t equilib ri um con￿g uration as a c on v e n tion. H o w ev er, t he r e st r icti v eness
of t he lo w er b o und o n N dep ends o n the pa r am e ters o f the m o del. I n the stage
ga m e (2), thi s b oun d would b e 5 : 5, s uch tha t e ￿cien t con v en tions are stab l ei n
p o pulati o ns o f six or m or e p l a y e rs . No te that, while th e l o w er b o und o n N is
su￿ci en t for the set of e￿cien t con v en tions to b e stab l e, a ne c essary co ndit i on
￿
for this result is N> 4. T hi si sb e c a use v <N = 2, since the e q uilibrium ( x; x )i s
L
ri s k domi na n t( a ￿ c<d ￿ b ). Conse quen tl y ,an e cessa ry c on d ition for R (￿ ) > 2
y
is N=2 > 2. Th i si mp li es th at, in p opula tions of less tha n ￿v ep l a y er s , only ri sk
dominan t con v enti o ns prev ail i n the l o ng run.
136.1 No Inform ati on
This sec tion deals with the extrem e c as e of p = 0 un de r S2 , i . e. pla y ers who
mo v e to a new lo c at i on ca nnot a djust the ir stra t eg i es and sti ck to the ir prev ious
stra t eg y a fte rm o vi ng . I nt h i s cas e ,o nly risk domi na n te quilibriu m con￿g urations
can b e sto c h astic al ly stable. T he reas on is that CR (￿ ) is no wm uc h larger tha n
y
in the c as e of p> 0 . I f the pl a yers hav en o c hance a t a l l to a djust the ir s trateg ie s
after m o ving to a ne wl o cation, t w o tre mbles do not s u￿ ce to reac h the basin o f
attra c tion of a y {c on v e n tion from a n x {conv enti on . T o see this, cons i der a s tate
￿ 2 ￿ where a l l pla y er s l ive at s ome lo ca ti on L , a nd supp ose t w o pla y ers m o ve
x
0 0
to an other lo c at i on L = 2 C ( L ) a nd switc ht o y . C all the resultin g state ￿ .A s
0
b efore, the 2 pla y er s a t L g ain the m ax i m al pa y o￿ d . Co nseq ue n tly , all o ther
0
N ￿ 2 pla y ers wil lm o v et o L in the next p e rio d . But, since the y a re unab l et o
adjus t the ir strat egies at the new lo c ation, the y wil lc o n ti n ue to pla y x.T h us,
0 ￿




As a c o nseque nce, ￿ is in D (￿ ). T h us , t w o tre mbles d o no t su ￿ce to le a ve the
x
bas i n o f a ttracti o n of an y x{c on v en ti on. Instead , the n um b er o f tre m bl es mus t
0
b e su ch tha t y g ains a hi g her pa y o ￿ tha n x int h e new state ￿ .T h i sw i ll b e the
￿




N ( a ￿ c )+ d￿ a
R (￿ ) = CR (￿ ) = +1 ;
x y
a ￿c + d ￿ b
where the ￿rst equalit y foll o w s from L e m m a 2 . An anal og o u s ar gu m e n t yields
$ %
N ( d ￿ b)+ a ￿d
R (￿ ) = CR (￿ ) = +1 :
y x
a￿ c + d ￿b
Note that the as sumpti o n concerning p do es n ot m ak ea n y di ￿erenc ew i th resp e ct
to the com putation of R (￿ ) a nd CR (￿ ). T he re a son i s tha t p a￿ects the pla y ers’
y x
abilit yt o a d j u st their s t ra te gi es on ly if th e ym o v e to a l o cation outs i de the ir c ur-
rent nei gh b ourh o o d. As y {c on v en tions yield a higher pa y o￿ than x {conv enti o ns,
there i sa l w a ys a st rong incen tiv et o m o v e to a neigh b o urho o d where o nl y y is
play ed. C on v ersely,n o p l a y e rw ould c on tem pl at e m o vi ng from a l o cation where
only y is pl a yedt o o ne wher e x is pla y ed . Therefore, an x{c on v en tion canno t
be r e ac hed fro m a y {c on v en tion b ys o m ep l a y e rs m o ving to a no ther lo cation an d
switc hing to x,b e ca us e n o p l ay er w ould fo l low. H ence, the v alue of p is re le v an t
only with rega r d to th e co m puta ti on o f CR ( ￿ ) and R (￿ ).
y x
Sinc e( a ￿ c ) > ( d ￿ b ) (the equilib r ium ( x; x )i s r i s k do m inant), si m ple com puta-
ti o ns sho w that R (￿ ) >N = 2, wh e reas CR (￿ ) <N = 2. A ccording to Theorem
x x
1, this pro ves the foll o wi ng prop ositi on .
Prop osit ion 3 In the mo de l S2, if p =0 , on ly risk do min ant c onventions ar e
￿
sto c hastic al ly stab le, i. e . ￿ (￿ ) = 1 .
x
The i m p o ssibil it y to adjus t one’ ss t r a tegy a t a new l o cation th us re s tores the
fami liar result that on l yr i s k domi na n te quilibria prev ail in the l o ng run. It i s
14easy to see tha t the sa m e result ho l ds i n S1 for the tri vial case o f p (L; M )=0 f o r
all M 6= L:I fp l a y e rs canno t obs e rv ea n ythi ng o utsi d e the ir o wn nei gh b ourho o d,
they wi ll nev er m o v e, a nd the m o de l is e qui v al ent to one wi th no m obil ity .
7 Re stricted Mobil it y
W eh a v e see n that, un de r the as sumpti o n o f unrestric ted m ob i lit y , a bsorb i ng
sta te s are c ha racte rized b ya l l pla y e rs living at the sa m el o c at i on . W e wil ln o w
consider the c as e t h at l o c at i on s h a v e a lim ited capa c ity to accom o da te pla y ers.
Supp ose the n um be r of inhabitan ts o f l o cation L ina n y p er i o d is b oun de da b o v e
P
￿ ￿
b y L , N< L . In this case, the pla y ers’ fre edom o f c hoice w i th resp e ct to
L 2L
lo cations m i gh t b e restricted: A pla y er w ho w an ts to m o v em i gh t b e prev ente d
from d oi n g so b ecause the lo cation of hi sc hoic ei s fully o ccupied. If th i sh a p p ens,
w es i mp l y as sume tha t the fully o c cupi e dl o c at i o ns are dropp e d fro m the pla y-
ers’ c hoice set. I n thi sv arian t o f the m o del ,L e m m a 1 no longer ho l ds . Instead,
abs orbing sta te s a re no wc harac teriz ed b y sev eral o c cupie d lo c at i o ns. As a cons e -
que nc e, the c o e xis te nc e of b oth c on v en tions can b e obs e rv edi n abs orbing st ates.
T o see this, con si der the foll o wing si m ple ex am p l e. Supp o se there are o nl yt w o
lo cations , and the capa ci t y o f one of them is restricted to ha l f the p o pulati on.
Then, the sta te w he re eac hl o cation is inhabited b y h alf o f the p o pul at i on , a nd
the y {c on v en tion pre v ai ls a t the one l o cation w hi le the x{c on v en tion pre v ai ls a t
the other, is a bsor bi ng . This i sb e c a use, giv en th e im p o s sibi lit yo f m o vi n g fo r the
x {play ers, no pla y er has a n i ncentiv et o c ha nge his strat egy .H ence, r estri cting
the pla y ers m obil itym ight le a d to the c o existence of con v enti o ns in the so c i et y .
In the c a se o f restric ted m ob i lit y ,w eh a v et o d e a l with ab so rbi ng se ts ra the r
P
￿
than absorbi n g sta te s . This is b e caus e ,a s N ￿ L ,t h e re is a lwa ys a t l eas t
L 2L
one lo c at i o n where x is pla y ed tha t is not f ul ly o ccupied (lo c at i o ns where the
y {conv ention prev ail sm ust b e fully o ccupied b ec a use ot herwise x {play ers wou l d
mo v e to tha t lo c at i o n). No wi f there ar es e v e ra l lo cations where x is pla y ed, the x {
play ers a re i ndi￿eren tb e t w een these lo c at i o ns, a nd the re is a p o siti v e pro bab i lit y
of m o veme n tb e t w ee n these l o cations.
An y abs orbing set w i th co ex istenc e of con v enti on s isc hara c terized b ya l lp l a y e rs
at the s ame l o cation pla ying the s ame s tra te gy ,a n d a l ll o cati o ns where y is pl a yed
b eing fully o ccupied. T he se to f a l ls u c h sta te si s denoted b y￿ .
co
Unfortunately , re sults c o nce rning s to c h astic sta bi lit y of absorbi ng set sc a n b e
deri ved only under v ery restri ctiv e c onditi on s con c ern ing the p o pulati on size rel-
ativ e to the c a paci ty constra i n ts. Ho w ever, for the case o f t w ol o cations, i t can
easil y b e sho w n tha t sta te si n v ol vi ng onl y e￿cie n t pla y c a nnot b e sto c h astic al ly
sta bl e. W e pro vet h er e su l tb ys h o win g tha t all sto c ha sti cally stable state s are
containe di n ￿ [ ￿ . T hat i s, e very sto c h astic al ly s table s ta te con tains at l ea st
co x
one lo c at i o n where the i ne ￿cien tc on v en tion pre v ai ls.
15Let ￿ :=￿ [ ￿.
cox co x
￿




Pr o of. S upp o se the re a re 2 lo c at i o ns, L and M ,a n d M ￿ L .W e ￿rst com pute
the radius of ￿ . T he eas i est w a yt o l e a v e D (￿ ), i. e. to tran sit to D (￿ ),
cox cox y
is to s t a rt fro m the sta te in ￿ 2 ￿ wh e re the y { con v en tion is p l a yeda t L ,
co co
￿
the lo ca ti on with the l ess re s tri ctiv e capa c ityc o nstra int. Then there are N ￿ L
￿
play ers at M playin g x . In o rde r to reac h D (￿) , a t l e a s t n ￿ v of these
y M
M
x {play ers m us t switc ht o y . The other x {play ers will then imitate y in the nex t
p erio d. Th us, the radius is
$ %
￿
( N ￿ L)( a ￿ c )+ a ￿d
R (￿ )= +1 :
cox
a ￿ c + d ￿ b
The cora di us i s the m inim um n umb er of trem bles req ui red to re ac h D (￿ ) from
co x




such that n = N ￿ L .I f a t l east v o f the pl ay ers at M sw i tcht o x , the o ther
M
M
inhabitan ts o f M wi ll fol lowi n the n e xt p e rio d. Th us, the corad i us i s
$ %
￿
( N ￿ L)( d ￿ b )+ a ￿d
CR (￿ )= +1 :
co x
a ￿ c + d ￿ b
The a ssum pti o ns o n risk dominance and e ￿ciency e ns ure t h at the ra di us e xcee ds
the coradius. 2
Whil e states ex hib iting o vera l le ￿ciency o f pla y a re excluded fro m the set o f
sto c ha sti ca l ly st able states, s tates wh e re on l y the ine ￿cien te q uili briu m i sp l a y e d
are not. T he reaso n i s tha t a state where a l lp l a y x ca n ea si ly b e reac hed fro m a
sta te i n￿ .T h us, re stric ted m ob i lit y actuall y prev en ts the pl a yers fro m re ac hi ng
co
an o v erall e ￿cien t outcome; it m i gh te v e n prev en te ￿cien tp l a ya l to gether .
A thorough a nalysi s of a sim ila r m o del with restri cted capa c ity can b e foun d i n
An w a r (1 996). His m o d e l is bas e d o n the b est re ply ru l e instead o f imitation, and
the l o cations ha v ee q ua l cap aci tyc o nstrain ts. In that c as e , equilibrium s el ection
resul ts dep e nd on the param ete rs o f the m o del , i. e. stage ga m ep a y o ￿s and
capa c ityc o nstrai n ts. How ever, o vera l l e￿cien t sta t es canno t b e sto c h ast ic a l ly
sta bl e. T hi s sho ws that the quali tativ e result tha t o v er all e ￿ciency i se x cl ud e di s
inde p ende n t o f the ex ac t s p e ci ￿ c at i o n of t he learning pro cess and th e param ete rs
of t he mo del .
I hav ec hosen to m o de l restri cted m ob i lit yb yi m p o sing capa c ity constra i n ts on
lo cations . Altern ativ el y , o ne could im agine a v ar i et yo f other p os si ble re stric -
ti on s t o a p l a y er’s m obil it y .F or instan c e, one c ou l d assum e that m o vi ng i nc urs a
cost whic h increa s es i n the n um be r o f p l a y ers already re si ding a t the destin ation.
Then th e re is a lim i t to the n um be r o f p l a y ers b ey ond whic hm o ving is no lon ger
7
Thi s s tate c a nb e r e ached from an y othe r state i n￿ wi t h z er o tr em bl es .
y
16w orth whil eb e cau s e i ti s to o costly . T his lim i tw ould b e e qui v alent to a cap a ci t y
constra i n t. A no the r p o ssibil it yw ou ld b e to all o w the i nha bi ta n ts o f a lo c at i on to
refuse p oten ti al im m igran ts. Also, fricti on i n the ad j u stm ent pro c ess ca n b e m od -
el ed in a w a y that i td e ters p l a yers fro mm o v ing, as e xplai ne di n the c o ncl us i on
to thi s pap er . As a m atter o f fact, the e xact sp e ci￿ca ti o n of m ob i lit y restri c tions
plays n o role . What ex ac tly pre ven ts the pl ay ers from m o vi ng i s jus t a que st i on
of i n te rp r eta t ion , a nd th us irrel ev an t with resp e ct to the formal m o del.
8 Con clusion
The m o d e ls of E l y( 1 9 95 ) and Oec hs sl er (1 997) sho w tha t m o bilit y pro m ot e s
e￿ cien t pla y in co o rdi n ati o n ga m es. T he presen t pa p er re i nforces tha t r esult.
Eveni f p l a y e rs can o nl yi m p e rfectl y o bs e rv e pla ya t d i st a n tl oc at i o ns, o r i f the
stra t eg y adjus tm en t pro ce s s is i m p ed ed b yf ricti o n, the set o f e￿cie n tc on v en tions
rem ai ns s table .H o w ev er, the exact sp eci￿cation o f the w a y friction is i n tro duce d
in to the adaptatio n rul ec a n b e crucia l , as a com parison w ith B ha sk ar and V ega {
Redondo (1996) sh o ws. As fa r as th e und e rly ing assum ptions are c on c erned,
thei rs is the m o del probabl y m ost cl o s el y rela te dt o m yo w n. Bhaska r and V ega {
Redondo as sum et h a t, i n each p erio d, e ac h play er gets t h e opp o rtunit y to adj us t
his s t ra te g y for the co o rdi na ti o n g ame only with a cert ai n prob abil ity , p. A
play er’s decis i on w he th e rt o m o v et o a n other l o cati o n or not is then based on
exp e ct e d pa y o ￿s, a nd a p l a yerw i ll m o v e to anothe rl oc at i o n on l yi fh i se xp ec te d
pa y o ￿ a t tha t l o cation ex ceeds hi s cur ren t (secure) pay o￿. F o r insta nc e, consider
ap l a y e rc urren tl y residin g a t a l o cation L where the ri s k domi na n t con v enti on
prevail s, hi sp a y o￿ b e i n g a . Sup p os e the re is a nother lo c at i on , s a y M , where
the e￿cie n tc on v en tion i s pla y ed. If the pla y er m o vedt o M , his e xp e cted pa yo￿
w ould b e pd, the pro ba bi lit y of his getti n g the opp ortunit y to adjust his stra te gy
ti me s t h e p a y o￿ p r e sentl y gained a t M .N o w, i f the e xp ected pa yo￿ fall s sho rt
of his prese n tp a y o ￿a , the pla y er wil l not m o v e, e ven tho ugh he might get the
higher pa y o￿ d ifh ed i d. T h us , the fact tha t f ricti o n is ta keni n to accoun tp r i or
to m o vi ng c a n actua lly deter pl a yers from m o ving to a l o cation wh e re the e ￿cien t
conv enti on prev ail s. I nm y m o del, in c on trast, the fri ct ion is n ot cons i der ed i n
the l o cation c hoic e, and pl a yers wil l alw a ysm o v et o a l o c ation where the b et ter
conv enti on prev ail s, unl ess there a re c a paci ty constra i n ts. H ence, the w a y fricti on
is m o del ed b yB ha sk ar a nd V eg a{Redondo serv es the sa m e purp ose as the cap aci ty
constra i n ts i nm y m o del :b o t h m a y prev ent a pla y er fro m m o ving to a pre ferred
lo cation.
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